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Evaluating Majority Party Leaders in Congress
Daniel Palazzolo

Abstract
Evaluations of majority party leaders come from three main sources: political scientists,
media analysts, and members of Congress. Political scientists are the theoreticians. They have
defined concepts and developed theories for evaluating leadership style, strategy, and strength.
Journalists are the watchdogs. They regularly evaluate leader performance in response to
contemporary events. Members of Congress then serve as the judges and juries. They occasionally
advise leaders on tactics and strategies, and they ultimately have the ability to sanction or reward
leaders.
KEYWORDS: leaders, Congress, leadership, Speaker, majority leader
Author Notes: I thank Randall Strahan and Sean Theriault for their helpful comments on this
paper.
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Who have been the most influential Speakers of the House or Senate
majority leaders, and what explains their influence? Which of them was most
effective in terms of advancing institutional, party, or policy goals? Is Nancy
Pelosi (D-CA) a “successful” Speaker? Is Harry Reid (R-NV) an effective
majority leader? Those questions deserve the attention of political scientists,
media analysts, and Members of Congress:
• Political scientists have developed theoretical expectations for
evaluating leaders by identifying the roles they play along with the
political and institutional conditions and personal qualities that affect their
styles, strategies, and strength. A few political scientists have also
evaluated the effectiveness of leaders in terms of advancing political,
institutional, and policy goals.
• Journalists, serving as watchdogs of ongoing developments in
Congress, are much more likely to inquire about and evaluate leadership
performance while leaders are in office. Yet they rely upon a broad range
of criteria for evaluating these leaders, not all of which correspond with
political science theories of leadership.
• Members of Congress, finally, the judges and juries in the evaluation
of party leaders, appear to make judgments that involve a kind of synthesis
of the standards employed by political scientists and the news media.
Political Science Theories of Party Leadership
Political scientists have contributed to the evaluation of party leaders in three
ways. First, they provide the most comprehensive descriptions of leadership roles
and explanations of leadership goals, both of which seem to be essential starting
points for evaluating leaders. Second, they have developed theories, including the
conditions and personal qualities that explain how leaders perform roles, pursue
goals, and wield influence. Third, although most political scientists have hesitated
to evaluate leader performance or effectiveness, a few have considered how well
leaders have advanced the representative and lawmaking functions of Congress.
Each of these observations deserves consideration.
Before evaluating majority party leaders, we should begin with their job
descriptions. The Speaker of the House, the only House leadership position
mentioned in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, is elected first by the
majority party and then by the whole House of Representatives. Though formally
recognized as the presiding officer of the House, the Speaker has always been a
political figure (Follett 1896). Today, the Speaker plays a major role in advancing
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the electoral and policy goals of the majority party. The Speaker is involved with
committee appointments, controlling the legislative agenda through the House
Rules Committee, communicating the priorities of the majority party through the
media, raising money for the party and its candidates, maintaining party unity,
and negotiating the terms of major legislation with Senate leaders and the
President.
The Speaker is assisted by the majority (floor) leader, whip, and
conference chair, each of whom performs specific tasks for the majority party.
The majority leader is mainly responsible for scheduling legislation and managing
business on the House floor. The majority whip polls party members to determine
support for major bills and persuades wayward members to support the
leadership’s position. While Congress is in session, the majority whip holds
weekly meetings where members offer their views on issues and strategy. The
majority party’s conference, or caucus, chair (Republicans refer to their party as a
“conference,” while Democrats call theirs a “caucus”) is mainly responsible for
formulating and disseminating the party’s message.
Although Senate party leaders carry out similar tasks, the Senate has a
different leadership structure. Unlike the House which has always had a Speaker,
the Senate did not develop a structure for party leadership until the end of the 19th
Century, and neither party formally elected floor leaders until 1913. Today, the
Senate majority party elects its majority leader, whip, and conference chair. Party
leaders in the Senate perform similar roles to their counterparts in the House: they
organize their respective parties, negotiate the legislative schedule, and serve as
the chief spokespersons for their parties. Yet the legislative process in the Senate
is very different from the House, and the differences affect the actions of party
leaders.
The Senate has nothing comparable to a Speaker of the House or the
institutions that allow the majority party to control the legislative process. The
Senate has nothing comparable to the House Rules Committee and no rules that
require amendments to be germane to the legislation before the Senate. Thus,
where the majority party leadership in the House can virtually dictate the floor
schedule through the Rules Committee and the discretion of the Speaker’s power
to recognize members on the floor, the Senate operates on the basis of unanimous
consent agreements.
The Senate also grants rights to individual members and to the minority
party. A single Senator can block progress by putting a hold on a bill, or by
offering non-germane amendments to bills under consideration on the Senate
floor. A minority of Senators can filibuster a bill or a resolution, and it takes sixty
votes, three-fifths of the one hundred Senators, to end debate. The major role of
the Senate majority leader is to negotiate with the minority leader to develop
unanimous consent agreements and the daily floor schedule, and to accommodate
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the wishes of individual senators. Consequently, unlike the Speaker of the House,
the Senate majority leader depends more on personal skill than formal powers to
carry out leadership tasks. The majority leader also must work on a bipartisan
basis in order to move legislation.
With these job descriptions in mind, the logical next step toward
evaluation of majority party leaders in Congress would require devising metrics
for each of these tasks. Measuring the rate of success is feasible for only some
tasks. One could measure fundraising effectiveness and the degree of leadership
involvement in agenda setting (Sinclair 1999) and make judgments about how
well a leader articulates a message (Evans and 2000). But standard metrics for
evaluating member satisfaction with committee assignments, or objective
measures of agenda setting, floor management, and negotiating ability are much
tougher to develop.
The challenge of evaluating the effectiveness of leaders is complicated by
theories of leadership and congressional decision-making that explain the actions
of party leaders in an institutional context. Political scientists typically analyze
how leaders assist the House and Senate in carrying out their chief functions:
lawmaking and representation. Lawmaking requires delegation, deliberation,
coalition building, and decision making. Leaders try to use the lawmaking process
to advance the majority party’s electoral and policy goals: maintaining or
expanding majority control and passing legislation that reflects the party’s public
philosophy or addresses concerns voiced by their constituents. Representation,
meanwhile, requires that individual members of Congress are able to express their
views on legislation and advance the interests of electoral constituents and groups
through committee assignments, bills, and amendments. Leaders can help
members attain their individual goals: reelection, advancing public policy, and
gaining influence in Congress.
Perhaps the clearest indicators of success or failure for the majority party
in terms of lawmaking and representational functions are legislative output, party
unity, and number of seats gained or lost in an election. When the majority party
achieves these goals, one might be tempted to conclude that majority party leaders
performed effectively. Party leaders can certainly make a difference along all
three dimensions, but the extent to which we can identify leader effects depends
on our theories of leadership. Theories that explain leadership in terms of political
and institutional conditions obscure the role of the individual leader.
Given the various factors that affect lawmaking, party unity, and electoral
results, it is difficult to say how much success or failure can be attributed to the
leader. Legislative output is often affected by the size of the majority, the partisan
makeup of the other chamber, the president, public opinion, and party unity itself.
Leaders can use various tactics to improve party unity, but the degree of party
unity is also affected by external forces. Members who represent districts with
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similar types of constituents tend to vote together on bills that come to the floor.
Conversely, members from the same party who might represent a different
constituent base (say conservative Democrats) are less inclined to vote with most
members of their party. And election results are affected by a combination of
national conditions or local circumstances that may be unrelated to the
performance of party leaders.
In their seminal publication on leadership style, Cooper and Brady (1981)
compare the hierarchical leadership style of Speaker of the House Thomas B.
Reed (R-ME) and Joseph G. Cannon (R-IL) with the bargaining style of Speaker
Sam Rayburn (D-TX). They argue that leadership style is primarily a function of
party unity among the members of the majority party. When party unity is high,
members are more likely to encourage and tolerate centralized party leadership;
when party unity is low, members seek to distribute power away from a central
leadership position. Thus, Speaker Reed’s considerable powers were based on the
high levels of agreement on policy goals among party members at the end of the
turn of the twentieth century. He chaired a Rules Committee with only five
members, appointed members to committees, had the power to recognize
members from the floor, and blocked attempts by the minority party to obstruct
legislative business. Republican members viewed a powerful Speaker as the
means toward advancing the party’s national agenda of economic expansion
(Peters 1997), a goal they all shared, rather than a hindrance on their ability to
represent their particular constituencies.
Cooper and Brady (1981) further argue that a high degree of party unity
among members is derived from the policy preferences of the members’ voting
constituencies. In simple terms, if voters in different congressional districts share
similar views and elect members from the same party to represent those views,
then elected representatives of those parties will also hold similar policy
preferences. When individual members agree on the direction of the party, they
are thus more willing to cede power to a central leader, who can use that power to
advance the individual and collective goals of party members. On the other hand,
when members of the party represent diverse constituencies and hold different
policy preferences, they are less likely to vest power in the hands of a central
leader, and power is decentralized among committee chairs or individual
members. In this situation, the Speaker must be skilled at bargaining with factions
within the party and among committee chairs who have considerable power in
their own right. Sam Rayburn (D-TX), who served as Speaker on three different
occasions (1941-47, 1949-52, and 1955-61), mastered this style of leadership.
Other political scientists (Sinclair 1995 and Rohde 1991) have applied the
theoretical premises of Cooper and Brady to the study of majority party
leadership.
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There are, however, limits to how much contextual theories of leadership
can help us to evaluate majority party leaders. The theory has little to say about
the effects leaders have on leader effectiveness. Cooper and Brady (1981, 42)
define effectiveness as a matter of the “skill with which resources are used,” or
“actual results or achievements,” and conclude that “there is no direct relationship
between leadership style and effectiveness in the House.” But they do not attempt
to assess the effectiveness of Reed and Cannon or Rayburn. A purely contextual
theory of leadership seems to offer no basis upon which to evaluate leader
effectiveness. If leadership style is a consequence of forces beyond the control of
leaders, or if the institutional context constrains leaders from acting independently
of their followers, one can hardly assign a value to the effectiveness of leaders.
Studies that incorporate the individual qualities and discrete actions of
leaders can specify the roles key leaders played in periods of great institutional
change (Rohde 1991; Peters 1997; Strickler 2001; Strahan 2007) and judge when
they have exceeded the limitations on strong leadership (Jones 1968). They can
also evaluate their effectiveness in terms of facilitating both lawmaking and
representation. Randall Strahan’s (2007) study of Clay, Reed, and Gingrich
combines the effects of institutional context and individual leader qualities,
specifically the leader’s personal goals and propensity to take risks, in order to
explain leadership behavior. Strahan argues that all three leaders exercised
considerable influence over the policy agenda and institutional development of
the House of Representatives. He concludes by asking if assertive leaders are
effective leaders: “Does Congress work better under strong, risk-taking leaders?”
(Strahan 2007, 189)
The answer depends on how their actions affect the balance of
deliberative, representative, and lawmaking functions of Congress. Strahan argues
that among the three Speakers in his study, Clay did the best job of striking that
balance. By contrast, leaders, like Reed and Gingrich, who prized efficiency in
order to advance legislation, may seriously compromise the deliberative and
representative functions of Congress (see also Evans and Oleszek 1997) and
jeopardize the party’s ability to maintain its majority (Schickler 2001).
Richard Fenno (1997) criticizes the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich
and his Republican colleagues after gaining majority control of the House in 1994
for the first time in forty years. Fenno argues that Gingrich’s lack of experience
led to mistakes in interpreting the election results and governing thereafter. In
essence, Gingrich’s lack of experience caused him to overstate the importance of
the elections as a source of power in translating the Contract with America into
legislation. He also failed to set priorities, underestimated the power of the
presidency, and ignored the features of the political system that strongly bias
American politics toward incremental policy change.
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Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2006) describe how the actions of
leaders can weaken the institution of Congress. They specifically cite Majority
Leader Bill Frist’s efforts to challenge the super-majority requirement for ending
a filibuster of the President’s recommendations for Supreme Court justices. By
encouraging the Senate to pursue the so-called “nuclear option,” which would
have allowed a simple majority of the Senate to end debate on judicial nominees,
Frist risked undermining the tradition of minority rights that had distinguished the
Senate from the House. They also describe how Majority Leader Tom DeLay’s
abusive employment of earmarks and his shady dealings with corrupt lobbyists
undermined the ethical standards of the House. These are two examples, among
many, in which leaders contributed to the rise of partisan polarization and the
decline of accountability in Congress.
Thus, complex forces that affect leadership and congressional decisionmaking limit our ability to evaluate how leaders affect legislative output, party
unity, and election returns. Still, not all party leaders escape accountability for
success or failure in the murky waters of the legislative process. Some party
leaders are more inclined to take greater risks, establish clear goals (Strahan
2007), and thus assume responsibility for their party’s legislative record and
electoral success. It is no wonder that both Reed and Gingrich wound up abruptly
resigning from the House of Representatives.
What can political scientists theories tell us, then, about the performances
of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid? According to contextual theory, leaders must be
responsive to member concerns about advancing policy goals and re-election.
Having gained majorities in both chambers after the 2006 midterm elections, for
the first time in 12 years, Democratic constituents would be eager for major
policy changes. During the 2006 campaign, Democrats pledged to advance policy
in six areas (“Six for ’06”) including college access, affordable health care,
energy independence, jobs and wages, retirement security, and ending the war in
Iraq. Democrats were especially interested in ending the war, and Members also
sought ethics reform to end the “corruption of culture” in Washington (Sinclair
2008).
Yet Pelosi and Reid would be operating with very narrow majorities and
would have to contend with a larger number of centrist or conservative
Democrats, representing districts and states won by George Bush in 2004. Half of
the forty-two freshmen Democrats elected in 2006 actually represented districts
where George Bush won a majority of the vote in 2004, and four of the nine new
Democratic Senators hailed from states won by Bush (Cohen and Friel 2008). The
Blue Dog Coalition consisted of 49 fiscally conservative Democrats, including 13
freshmen who would face stiff Republican challengers in 2008 (Friel 2008). In
addition, Pelosi needed to deal with powerful senior committee chairs (Sinclair
2008), Reid did not have a filibuster-proof majority, and both had to live with the
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reality of a Republican president who could veto legislation that passed both
chambers.
It is not surprising that Pelosi and Reid have engaged in broad consultation
with members and committee chairs, and it is also not surprising that they have
had mixed success in terms of controlling the agenda and keeping the party
unified (Sinclair 2008). Both chambers managed to pass major legislation dealing
with lobbying reform, energy, and intelligence surveillance, but factions of the
party have splintered off on budget issues, funding for the war in Iraq, and, most
recently, drilling for oil. The Republican minority parties in the House and Senate
have proven to be a nuisance. In the House, the Republicans have managed to
thwart progress on legislation by skillfully using the motion to recommit
legislation, and in the Senate they have filibustered major legislation forcing an
unprecedented number of cloture votes (Sinclair 2008).
Given the institutional and political context, it is hard to determine how
much Pelosi and Reid are responsible for legislative record of the 110th Congress.
Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly (2008) argue that Reid had no chance of scoring
major legislative victories in a highly polarized Senate, but they suggest that Reid
has been modestly successful in terms of shaping public opinion on the Iraq War
debate. To this point, however, political scientists have yet to report findings from
any in-depth qualitative analysis on how the personal qualities of Pelosi or Reid
affect the lawmaking and representative functions of the House. Research by
Cindy Rosenthal and Ron Peters (2008) on Speaker Pelosi may soon offer more
insights into the role of personal factors in her leadership of the House. (See the
Peters and Rosenthal article in this issue of The Forum.)
At least along one dimension—maintaining majority control of the
chambers—both leaders seemed to be poised to enjoy success, though positive
results for the Democrats in 2008 are far from certain. In July, Democrats were
expected to pick up anywhere from 5 to 7 Senate seats and 10 to 15 House seats.
If these predictions hold, Pelosi and Reid will have more breathing room to drive
legislation. Yet, polls taken after the Republican convention in September of 2008
show increases in party affiliation for Republicans, increasing support for
Republican candidates, and very low approval ratings for Congress (Saad 2008;
Jones 2008). Thus, while Democrats are almost certain to hold their majorities in
the House and Senate, the gains may be less than were expected before Labor
Day. Moreover, intra-party factions will not disappear; a good number of
members will still be responsive to the more conservative districts and states they
represent. It will take skillful leadership to manage the policy agenda and keep the
party unified.
If Barack Obama is elected President, Pelosi and Reid would benefit from
having a Democrat in the White House, though this too will change the strategic
situation for the 2010 midterm elections. A unified Democratic government
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would enter Washington with huge expectations for change, a large policy
agenda, and total accountability for policy outcomes. A successful record over the
next two to four years could pay huge dividends for the party, yet Democrats need
only look back to 1993 and 1994 for a sober reminder of the perils of unified
government. If, on the hand, Republican John McCain is elected, the overarching
message may be that the public wants the two parties to work together. Pelosi and
Reid would need to deal with the disappointment most members will have over
losing a presidential election that seemed almost certain for the Democratic
candidate, while at the same time satisfying moderates and conservatives who ran
for office to address challenges with energy, the economy, health care, and
national security.
Media as Watchdog
On April 7, 1995, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich gave a televised address
to announce the completion of the first 100 days of the historic 104th Congress.
The House of Representatives had just fulfilled Gingrich’s promise that
legislation dealing with all ten items contained in the Contract with America
would be voted on by the House. At the outset of his speakership, news media
evaluations of Gingrich’s leadership were both frequent and plentiful. News
reporters and editorial writers across the country chimed in to offer their views on
Gingrich’s performance. His leadership of the House was variously described as
remarkable, compelling, convincing, audacious, and divisive, to mention just a
few adjectives.
Later that same year, in its last issue of 1995, Time magazine featured on
its cover Newt Gingrich, man of the year, and Time reporters were eager to judge
his performance. Nancy Gibbs and Karen Tumulty (1995, 54) dubbed Gingrich
the “Master of the House.” In his feature article, “Newt’s World: How One Man
Changed the Way Washington Sees Reality,” Lance Morrow (1995, 50)
proclaimed: “Leaders make things possible. Exceptional leaders make them
inevitable. Newt Gingrich belongs in the category of exceptional. All year—
ruthlessly, brilliantly, obnoxiously—he worked at hammering together
inevitabilities…” He continued: “Gingrich has changed the center of gravity…”
and “…transformed both the House of Representatives and the speakership into
unprecedented instruments of personal and political power. It has been an
amazing performance.”
Less than three years later, Gingrich would be found again on the cover of
Time, but fortunes by then had been totally reversed: the title mantra “Man of the
Year” had been replaced by “The Fall of Newt.” Gibbs and Michael Duffy (1998,
40) criticized Newt for “turning opportunity into rubble” after the Republicans
lost five House seats in the 1998 midterm elections. Meanwhile, Newsweek
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(1998) contemporaneously portrayed a grim-looking Gingrich on its cover,
entitled “The Loser.” The Speaker who had invented the Contract With America,
led the Republicans to their first House majority in forty years, and declared that
“one of my goals is make the House co-equal with the White House” (Gettinger
1995, 1206) resigned from office. He was widely blamed for having steered the
party in the wrong direction by making the election campaign a referendum on the
character of scandal-ridden president Bill Clinton.
Thus, where political scientists looking back on the Gingrich speakership
after he left the scene would debate whether Gingrich’s leadership could be
explained entirely by institutional and political context plus the expectations of
his followers (Sinclair 1999), or by some combination of context and his
individual qualities (Strahan and Palazzolo 2004), the news media did not hesitate
to evaluate Newt’s performance at the beginning, middle, and end of his
speakership. While Gingrich is an exceptional case, this brief review of media
coverage exemplifies the distinctive role of reporters and the news media in
evaluating congressional leaders. The news media are the watchdogs of Congress,
and their evaluation of leaders is an extension of their efforts to describe and help
their viewers and readers understand what is happening on Capital Hill. The news
media can hold leaders accountable to the public and offer a window into how
those leaders are running critical lawmaking institutions. They may also provide
fodder for interest groups and political parties looking for ways to engage their
followers in the legislative process, in fundraising, and in election campaigns.
In addition to offering more frequent evaluations of congressional leaders
than political scientists, the news media emphasize different criteria. Though
journalists often consult with political scientists and mention some of the
institutional and political conditions that affect leaders, they are more inclined
than political scientists to assign credit or blame for a party’s or an institution’s
performance to the personal skills or qualities of the leader. Leaders are judged to
be effective or not as a consequence of personal strengths and weaknesses more
so than the situation with which they are faced. Reporters typically refer to
caricatures of leaders based on their experiences and backgrounds. Gingrich the
history professor was thus a transformational leader, a revolutionary. His
successor Dennis Hastert (R-OH) was the soft spoken, burly, wrestling coach. Bill
Frist (R-TN) was the even-tempered physician.
Media coverage of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) fits the
pattern applied to other party leaders. Cindy Rosenthal and Ronald Peters (2008)
have identified the broad and eclectic range of personal criteria used to describe
her approach to leadership: “unfailingly gracious,” “relentless fighter,”
“politically shrewd,” with “collaborative skills,” and “the ability to make merry
while reaching for the jugular.” And the most prevalent frame of reference is her
personal background; she would bring to the speakership the nurturing qualities of
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a mother and grandmother along with the cagey political instincts she learned
from her father, a former Member of Congress and Mayor of Baltimore.
Intuitively, a leader’s performance relates to his/her personal background
and particular skills, but political scientists are more inclined to specify the
conditions that affect leaders, some of which may offer better chances of success
and effectiveness than others. Political scientists explain the consequences of
leadership actions with reference to the combined effects of political conditions
and personal qualities. Without a clear concept of the individual qualities that
matter most to leadership and a full understanding of the conditions that constrain
or permit leaders to act, news reporters may attribute too much credit or blame to
the discrete actions of the leader.
Compared with political scientists, reporters are also more inclined to
focus on how leaders affect the legislative rather than the representative aspects of
Congress. A leader is judged successful if he or she presides over a productive
Congress. As noted in The Economist (2007, 42), “Nancy Pelosi, the new
Democratic Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, has an impressive
record so far. Pelosi has pushed through a number of popular reforms in rapid
succession. In addition, she has secured a vote of no confidence in President
George W. Bush's new Iraq policy, allowing her party members to vent their
anger without cutting off funding. Pelosi has achieved all of this while looking
cool and stylish, but it remains to be seen whether she can maintain her
performance in the months ahead when she will have to deal with much more
difficult issues.”
As a result of the watchdog role, the news media are also more likely to
monitor and judge the ethical conduct of leaders. Actions taken by party leaders
may harm the public trust as well as advance the public interest. Investigative
journalists are the first line of inquiry into leaders who abuse power for personal
gain or who use unethical or unlawful means to advance the interests of their
party, constituents, contributors, or associates. Notwithstanding the work of Mann
and Ornstein (2006), political scientists are less likely than news reporters to
monitor and evaluate the ethical failings of party leaders.
Finally, although public approval ratings of congressional leaders are not
anywhere near as prevalent as approval ratings of the president, reporters refer to
poll results to evaluate party leaders. Though such ratings provide a succinct
measure of public perceptions of leaders, they offer minimal information to
evaluate most party leaders. The polls are too infrequent and the vast majority of
Americans cannot possibly know enough about Congress or the functions of
congressional leadership to make a reasonable judgment about a leader’s
performance. Still, data collected from polls offer a few insights about what the
public knows about party leaders.
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First, the public is more likely to register opinions about leaders who gain
a lot of public exposure, either because of their public relations efforts, scandals,
or their place in history. Second, the approval ratings of well known leaders
generally reflect the public persona cast in the media, or the state of their party in
Congress. Thus, Speaker Tip O’Neill, who was the first Speaker to hold press
conferences and who emerged as the liberal Democratic counterweight to
President Ronald Reagan’s efforts to reduce government spending, was relatively
well known to the public. In 1981 he had a 51% favorable rating, while 23% held
an unfavorable opinion of O’Neill. He left office in 1986 with 67% favorable
rating, while again just 23% had an unfavorable view.
By contrast, his successor, Jim Wright, was not well known to the public
until a scandal forced him out of office. In July of 1998, only 23% of the public
had an opinion of Wright (12% favorable and 11% unfavorable). Less than a year
later, when Wright was forced to resign from office, 58% of people had an
opinion, and 40% held an unfavorable view. Naturally, Newt Gingrich regularly
drew opinions from over 70% of the public, and his unfavorable ratings were
always higher than his favorables. Ironically, his highest approval rating (42%)
was registered in October of 1998, about a month before he resigned from office.
His successor, Dennis Hastert (R-OH), was much less well known, but his
favorable ratings were better than his unfavorables until 2006, when several
Republican members were enmeshed in scandals. (All poll results in this
paragraph were reported in Cohen 2007.)
The approval ratings for the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi,
and current Majority Leader, Harry Reid (D-NV), seem to be following traditional
patterns. Pelosi, the Minority Leader before the Democrats won the majority in
the 2006 elections, was generally unknown to the public prior to becoming the
Speaker, albeit more well-known than Hastert, who rose from relative obscurity
as the Majority Whip of the Republican Party in 1998. Just over half of the public
held opinions of Pelosi in October of 2006, and opinions were evenly divided
between those who held favorable and unfavorable views. (Cohen 2007). By
April of 2007, four months into her speakership, Pelosi was known by a larger
percentage of Americans and her ratings were favorable. A CNN/Opinion
Research Corporation Poll showed that 45% had a favorable view and 30% had
an unfavorable view of Pelosi, while only 13% had never heard of her. Yet
Pelosi’s favorable ratings have declined over the past year. The same polling firm
found by August of 2008 that Pelosi’s favorable rating had dropped to 38%, while
her unfavorable rating was 37% (see www.pollingreport.com).
Harry Reid is less well known than Pelosi. Several polls taken in
December of 2006 and January of 2007 indicated that 65-70% of Americans had
never heard of him, though his favorable ratings were slightly higher than his
unfavorables (CBS News Poll, 2007; Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll, 2006).
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By August of 2007, more people had opinions of Reid, and they were on balance
unfavorable: 27% favored him and 43% gave him an unfavorable rating. The
most recent poll results show that his favorable ratings (22%) continue to be much
lower than his unfavorable ratings (41%) (Rasmussen, 2008).
Members of Congress: Judges and Juries
Though only a handful of political scientists or journalists have been elected to
Congress, members of the institution seem, unconsciously, to blend elements of
the theoretician and watchdog perspectives in evaluating leaders. Members of
Congress have a vested interest in the success of their leaders, and since they elect
their leaders at the outset of every Congress, they are ultimately the judges and
juries of leadership performance. They can act as team players, supporting the
goals of their party, but they are essentially independent actors. Like journalists,
Members of Congress tend to see politics as a contest of personalities and often
explain behavior in terms of personal qualities of leaders.
In addition, Members of Congress periodically evaluate leader
performance. After all, their careers may depend upon the success or failure of
their party. Members may be particularly attentive to polling data on the
performance of leaders who draw a lot of media attention or who are under
investigation for ethical reasons. Yet the way Members evaluate their leaders are
aptly described by political science theories of leaders. Like political scientists
and in contrast with journalists, Members of Congress are more sensitive to the
contextual factors that affect a leader’s ability to perform his/her job and perhaps
even more forgiving when problems arise.
Consequently, in-between elections, Members of Congress give advice to
their leaders from time to time about the management of the party, the agenda,
and the work of the House or Senate. Because they are ultimately accountable to
members, most majority party leaders heed their counsel. Adaptation to changing
expectations is a part of leadership in a representative body, and member
evaluations of leader performance may cause leaders to change their ways. Steven
Smith (1987) and Barbara Sinclair (1983) describe how Speaker Tip O’Neill (DMA) responded to changes in the more transparent, decentralized House of the
late 1970s and 1980s. O’Neill adapted by including more members in decisionmaking and structuring choices on House floor votes to protect and advance the
interest of individual members. Thus members and leaders negotiate the terms of
their relationship during the course of a given Congress, much in the way elected
representatives negotiate their relationship with constituents in the face of
changing conditions (Fenno 2000).
Political scientists have been especially interested in the effects of
leadership elections on the relationship between leaders and Members. Elections
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for party leaders at the beginning of each Congress (every two years) give
Members a chance to make a judgment on their leaders’ performance. Members
elect leaders whom they can trust and whom they believe have the skills suited for
the challenges the party faces at any given time. Scholars who apply principalagent theories, derived from organizational economics, argue that the election of a
leader represents a bargain. Inherent in that bargain is that leaders must be
responsive to the expectations of the Members because Members have the
ultimate sanction—remove the incumbent leader and replace him/her with
someone who is more trustworthy (Sinclair 1995).
Yet scholars also point out that Members of Congress realize that
removing a leader from office brings its own costs, so that they are not likely to
act hastily (Cox and McCubbins 1993; and Rohde 1991). Members understand the
challenges leaders are faced with, whether they be internal party divisions, an
ossified Senate, or a President of the opposite party. Thus Members will tolerate
disagreements between themselves and the leader and even mistakes or poor
judgments by the leader. As Jones (1968) illustrates in his classic article on
Speaker Joe Cannon (R-IL) and Rules Committee Chair Howard W. Smith (DVA), Members will send a leader plenty of signals about their concerns and
expectations. But the leader must not have a tin ear or turn a blind eye, because
there are limits to strong leadership in a representative body, and the majority of
members have the final say in deciding who should serve as their leader.
True to form, House and Senate Democrats seem to sympathize with the
challenges Pelosi and Reid have had to address in the 110th Congress, at least after
the first session. Congressional Democrats may have been anxious about
Congress’s dismal approval ratings and frustrated with the progress of legislation
blocked in the Senate, but Barbara Sinclair (2008, 92) notes: “despite their
frustration, neither House nor Senate Democrats blame Reid and his leadership
team. And the House leadership is solidly ensconced and well regarded by its
members.” Sinclair attributes the general level of satisfaction to leadership efforts
to help members get re-elected through choice committee assignments, chances to
amend bills, and help with fundraising.
Of course, the final election results of 2008 will be the ultimate test. If
Republican candidates gain ground with late campaign tactics that hold Pelosi and
Reid responsible for a “do-nothing Congress,” confidence in the two leaders may
be somewhat diminished. Yet so long as the Democrats maintain majorities in the
House and Senate, Pelosi and Reid should be reappointed as Speaker and majority
leader, and their work will turn toward the business of governing.
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Conclusion
The perspectives of political scientists, journalists, and Members of Congress
provide a range of possibilities for evaluating congressional leaders. The
differences in the topics they evaluate, the criteria they use, and the approach they
take toward evaluation reflect their professional interests. Political scientists are,
above anything else, interested in developing theories to explain how Congress
works, and as a subset of that mission, it is not surprising that they want to explain
how leaders behave. Journalists serve a different purpose: informing their readers,
viewers, and listeners, who are more interested in the daily developments and the
individuals who shape them. Members of Congress have the greatest stake of all
in the evaluation of their leaders. Interestingly, they seem to blend the
perspectives of political scientists and journalists toward the distinctive goal of
serving as judges and juries.
As a member of the political science profession, I wonder how our
discipline can contribute more to the evaluation of party leaders. One suggestion
might be to devise a ranking of the most influential and effective party leaders in
history, as presidential scholars have done with presidents. We might need to let
down our inhibitions about making normative judgments, but the gains might be
worthwhile. Journalists might be more inclined to make better use of our theories,
and we might offer members and leaders a better sense of which of their
predecessors were most successful at managing the representative and lawmaking
functions of Congress and how they were able to do so. By making our theories
and findings more accessible, we might do the public and the institution more
good.
Sources
Cohen, Richard E. 2007. “Pelosi v. Bush.” National Journal (May 12): 22-29.
Cohen, Richard E. and Brian Friel. 2008. “The New Center.” National Journal
(March 8): 20-26.
Cooper, Joseph and David W. Brady. 1981. Institutional Context and Leadership
Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn. American Political Science
Review 75 (June): 411-26.
Cox Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party
Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brought to you by | University of Richmond
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/15 6:34 PM

Palazzolo: Evaluating Majority Party Leaders

15

Evans, C. Lawrence. 2000. “Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics,” in
Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress
Reconsidered, 7th ed. Washington: CQ Press.
Evans, C. Lawrence and Walter J. Oleszek. 1997. Congress Under Fire: Reform
Politics and the Republican Majority. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Fenno, Richard. 1997. Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th
Congress. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Fenno, Richard. 2000. Congress at the Grassroots: Representational Change in
the South, 1970-1998. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Follett, Mary Parker. 1896. The Speaker of the House. New York: Longmans,
Green and Company.
Friel, Brian. 2008. “Dog Days.” National Journal (June 14): 22-28.
Frisch, Scott A. and Sean Q. Kelly. 2008. “Leading the Senate in the 110th
Congress,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (January): 69-76.
Gettinger, Stephan. 1995. “’Contract’: Just a Step in the Speaker’s Plan,” CQ
Weekly (April 29): 1206.
Gibbs, Nancy and Karen Tumulty . 1995/1996. “Master of the House,” Time
(December 25-January 1): 54-83.
Gibbs, and Michael Duffy. 1998. “The Fall of the House of Newt.” Time
(November 16): 39-47.
Jones, Charles O. 1968. Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on
the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives. Journal of
Politics 30: 617-46.
Jones, Jeffrey M. 2008. GOP Increase in Party ID After Convention Not Unusual.
Gallup Report (September 11). http://www.gallup.com/poll/110215/GOPIncrease-Party-After-Convention-Unusual.aspx.
Mann, Thomas E. and Norman J. Ornstein. 2006. The Broken Branch: How
Congress is Failing America and How to Get it Back on Track. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Brought to you by | University of Richmond
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/15 6:34 PM

16

The Forum

Vol. 6 [2008], No. 3, Article 1

Morrow, Lance. 1995/1996. “Newt’s World: How One Man Changed the Way
Washington Sees Reality,” Time (December 25-January 1): 49-50.
Peters, Ronald M. Jr.. 1997. The American Speakership, 2 nd ed. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Rasmussen. 2008. Congressional Performance. Rasmussen Reports (August 27),
at:http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_am
erica/congressional_performance/congressional_performance.
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rosental, Cindy Simon and Ronald M. Peters. Jr. 2008. “Who is Nancy Pelosi?”
PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (January): 57-62.
Saad, Lydia. 2008. Battle for Congress Suddenly Looks Competitive. Gallup
Report (September 12) http://www.gallup.com/poll/110263/BattleCongress-Suddenly-Looks-Competitive.aspx.
Sinclair, Barbara. 2008. “Leading the New Majorities.” PS: Political Science and
Politics 41 (January): 89-94.
Schickler, Eric. 2001. Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the
Development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1983. Majority Leadership in the U.S. House. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The House of
Representatives in the Post-reform Era. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1999. “Transformational Leader or Faithful Agent? PrincipalAgent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership,” Legislative Studies
Quarterly 24 (August): 421-49.
Strahan, Randall. 2007. Leading Representatives: The Agency of Leaders in the
Politics of the U.S. House. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Strahan, Randall and Daniel J. Palazzolo. 2004. The Gingrich Effect. Political
Science Quarterly 119 (Spring): 51-74.

Brought to you by | University of Richmond
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/15 6:34 PM

